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## CONFLICT TERMINATION: INTEGRATING THE ELEMENTS OF POWER IN TODAY'S CHANGING WORLD

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI  
United States Army

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CONFLICT TERMINATION: INTEGRATING THE ELEMENTS  
OF POWER IN TODAY'S CHANGING WORLD

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Wojdakowski  
United States Army

Colonel Douglas W. Craft  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

# ABSTRACT

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The linkage between strategy and operations is the greatest challenge for military leaders in today's changing world. As the nature of conflict evolves with the end of the Cold War era, United States policy to deal with conflict also evolves. This evolution causes immense challenges for all leaders as they seek to accomplish political aims by exerting the elements of power.

In America's last two military conflicts, JUST CAUSE in Panama and DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf, the termination of the military campaign did not accomplish the established political aims. This paper seeks to clarify why achieving political objectives is such a difficult proposition. As its central idea, the tension between exerting military power and exerting diplomatic, economic and political power will be explored. This clarifies why terminating military conflict while achieving the conditions which accomplish the political aims is so difficult.

The concept of using military force as a last resort is explored, as well as the idea of decisive force. Also, and most importantly, the paper analyzes an approach toward the nature of disputes as a means to clarify the roles military power can take. As a result, this paper identifies the key aspects of how we must think about conflicts and their termination in the future.

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## INTRODUCTION

On 27 December 1992 two United States Air Force F-16 fighters shot down an Iraqi MIG combat plane over Southern Iraq. This was followed by an airstrike by Allied forces on 13 January 1993 against a series of ground targets in Iraq. Several other confrontations have occurred since then.<sup>1</sup> The continued use of United States fighter aircraft and missiles in the Gulf region is but one example of the difficulty involved in conflict termination. Why are American combat forces still fighting in the region? After all, the coalition suspended combat operations on/about 28 February 1991, amid resounding accolades of tremendous success. One could question, and many have, whether the conflict was really terminated in 1991, and whether or not it accomplished the strategic goals established in the region.

Twenty years ago in the book Every War Must End, Fred C. Ikle put forward the premise that ending a war is much harder than starting one. A host of forces exist which make clear-cut victory not only difficult to achieve, but hard to identify even when it occurs.<sup>2</sup> Coupled with this most recent book on the subject of conflict termination, Clausewitz, in his profound discussion on the theory of war On War, clearly explained one theoretical construct of war which all modern strategists accept; that is, "no one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it".<sup>3</sup> These two ideas, formulated in vastly different

environments separated in time by almost two hundred years, form an excellent basis for a contemporary look at conflict termination.

The two aspects of war mentioned above also pertain to writing a paper. After all, one ought not start a paper without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by writing it or how he intends to achieve it. The premise of this paper is that we can clarify the problem with conflict termination by clarifying the linkage between strategy and military operations. This can best be done by focusing upon the one characteristic which best illustrates the difficulty with linking strategy and military operations. That is, the tension caused by the vast difference between exerting military power and the other forms of power. We will explore this tension by using contemporary thoughts and examples from our two most recent conflicts, JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM. This paper, in keeping with U.S. Army War College principles, is not focused upon how to conduct conflict termination or post-conflict activities. Our focus is upon how to think about conflict termination. By imposing these limits, we avoid the problem espoused in the first aspect of war mentioned above, that starting a paper such as this is much easier than ending one.

The linkage between strategy and military operations significantly effects our inability to end conflicts. The tension between the use of military power and the elements of political, diplomatic and economic power makes this linkage a

difficult prospect as we consider how conflicts will end. To describe and explain the linkage is fairly easy, but to achieve it is extremely difficult. Clausewitz described it when he said, "War is merely an extension of policy by other means".<sup>4</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, captures it by saying "operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight" in order to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>5</sup> The U.S. Army War College explains it by saying the National Command Authority (NCA) decides upon policy goals and these goals are converted into attainable objectives and then accomplished by the exertion of all elements of power.<sup>6</sup> In essence, it is not hard to accept the importance of linking economic, diplomatic, and political power with military power to protect and support the strategic interests of America. It is hard to achieve this linkage.

The tension which makes the linkage between military and all other forms of power so difficult to achieve centers on the concept of risk. Although military power is only one of many types of power, and is surely just another political tool in the arsenal of our National Command Authority (NCA), the risk of probable loss of human life (on both sides) when conducting military operations distinctly separates its use from all the others. As a result, a host of factors which have grown from past experiences both good and bad, come into play when we consider exerting military power. Each of these complicates the affair when it is time to end the conflict. These factors also



complicate planning for the use of military power, especially when it is linked with the other power "tools" available. What then are these factors and the ramifications for conflict termination of each?

### LAST RESORT

First is the factor of last resort. In the Cold War era, defined as post-World War II through 1990, the policy of exerting military power only as a last resort achieved prominence. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense in 1985, included using military power as a last resort as the final test of his six tests for committing military forces.<sup>7</sup> This factor is still with us today, and although our purpose is not to defend it as a concept, various good reasons exist for its prominence. These reasons provide some insight into the difficulty involved in linking the elements of power.

The very nature of the Cold War, with its focus on "containment" of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and the resulting possible escalation of military confrontations into nuclear holocausts, supported last resort as a policy. Today, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction keeps this idea in tact and supports the continuation of the policy. The Vietnam War with its "limited", ill-defined political objectives and the ultimate loss of support from the American people played a key role in its formulation. America

committed forces piecemeal, never declared war and failed to link strategy with military operations in Vietnam.<sup>8</sup> The concept of last resort was one reaction to this debacle; last resort would ensure decisive commitment of military force in the future. As these same considerations are still present, the concept of last resort remains important.

The technological revolution, and the resulting increased lethality on the battlefield played a part. This, coupled with the technological impact on the media which allows for the graphic portrayal of the effects of battle to be immediately shown in the living rooms of the World had an impact. Americans can see the immense destruction of war more clearly than ever before, even as new technology increases lethality at an alarming rate. As a result, technology remains a key factor in support of last resort.

Finally, as already mentioned, the risk to human life inherent in the use of military force, more adequately displayed by the reasons given above, argues for the exertion of military force only as a last resort. One can only put American lives in harm's way for cogent, important reasons. To do otherwise, risks the same type of failure demonstrated in the Vietnam War.

The ramifications of the last resort factor on the linkage between military and other forms of power and conflict termination are profound. First and foremost, last resort means we use military power after the other elements of power have failed to achieve strategic objectives. This idea profoundly

affects all leaders as they attempt to coordinate, integrate and employ power in complementary ways. For military leaders converting strategic objectives into attainable, military, operational ones poses a significant problem. This complication is one cause of the difficulty with achieving end-states. It also complicates the integration of the other elements of power. Our two most recent conflicts provide vivid examples of this problem.

JUST CAUSE, the military conflict in Panama in December 1989, "went like clockwork and involved very few glitches", yet the primary strategic objective, the restoration of Panamanian Democracy, has still not been achieved.<sup>9</sup> Many reasons exist for this failure; the implications of last resort cannot be ignored.

For thirty years the U.S. exerted economic influence, diplomatic means, political resources and military coercion in Panama to sow the seeds for democracy.<sup>10</sup> These all failed and, ultimately, the U.S. committed overwhelming force (as a last resort) in an attempt to accomplish the objectives. The mere fact that massive U.S. military force was used is proof that U.S. foreign policy in Panama failed.<sup>11</sup> In essence, America expected the military conflict to accomplish what thirty years of effort had failed to accomplish. And, although conflict termination brought stability to an otherwise volatile situation and lead to the dissolution of the corrupt Noriega government, democracy was by no means ensured.

When put into context, it is easy to see why the military conflict did not resolve the question of democracy in Panama. Certainly, the complex challenges faced in Panama provide an excellent example of the difficulty in achieving coherence between all the elements of power. By exercising decisive force as a last resort in Panama we expected to quickly achieve a previously failed objective; these expectations were too high.

Parallels between JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM abound, especially considering that U.S. combat forces are still fighting in the Gulf region. In the case of the Persian Gulf War, the military campaign was executed fairly quickly and decisively, just as in JUST CAUSE. Upon termination of the conflict, the military conditions for peace were achieved. Still, the expectation of insuring peace and stability in the region, stated as the objective of promoting peace and stability, has still not been achieved.<sup>12</sup> In DESERT STORM military force was only used as a last resort as it became "apparent that political and economic sanctions would not produce a timely resolution of the conflict".<sup>13</sup> Again, exerting decisive, overwhelming military power did not terminate all elements of the conflict and the American people remain dissatisfied with the result. This conflict, just like JUST CAUSE, highlights the difficulty with linking the elements of power. When military power was used as a last resort it failed to quickly achieve all the perceived political aims.

U.S. Army doctrine aptly explains the purpose of military conflict. "Wars are fought for political aims. They are only successful when these aims are achieved and retained."<sup>14</sup> In both the cases mentioned above, the use of military force did not accomplish the long-term political aims. In each case we are lead back to the dilemma outlined by the two aspects of war espoused by Clausewitz and Ikle and the difficulty in actually achieving the political objective while terminating the war. The answer to this dilemma lies somewhere between last resort as a viable policy and the misperception that the commitment of military forces provides a final solution to problems. In practical terms, an ordering of thoughts about these two ideas helps clarify the problem.

The thought of using military force as a last resort may be an outdated, unachievable concept in today's world.<sup>15</sup> The proliferation of the military concept of "operations other than war" logically supports this idea. Likewise, the tendency of the NCA to consider military options early in crisis situations before exhausting all other means, such as in Yugoslavia, supports this thought. Isn't the military fighting a pitched battle with the NCA at this very minute over the commitment of military forces in Yugoslavia?<sup>16</sup> Doesn't that indicate that last resort as a criterion needs further explanation? Perhaps exerting "military force is not diplomacy by other means, but rather the final indictment of a failed policy."<sup>17</sup>

The truth about the matter of last resort lies, not in its relevance in today's world, but in the expectations or objectives the military force is to achieve. Current writings shed some light on this subject. Both Mike Rampy in The End Game: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities and Bruce B.G. Clarke in Conflict Termination: A Rational Model, espouse military conflict and its termination as only a temporary condition.<sup>18</sup> Terminating the military conflict is merely a step in the direction toward attaining the strategic end-state.

We may characterize this step as achieving coercive leverage, as Rampy does, or as forcing the opposing nation-state to change its objectives, as Clarke does. But, in today's world, at least in our two most recent conflicts, clearly terminating the military conflict does not equate to achieving all strategic aims. There seems to remain an unfinished political, economic and diplomatic situation. Conflict termination can only set the stage for post-conflict activities when other forms of power must once again be used. Other means have failed, military power is exerted to "control" the situation, and then other means are again tried. The tension between these separations in power exertion makes the integration of their use, at best, a haphazard operation.

## DECISIVE FORCE

Decisive force is another important concept which closely links last resort with our inability to achieve political objectives. Applying diplomacy, economic influence and political leverage takes time. One only has to study the organization and bureaucratic consensus-building nature of the United Nations to get a flavor for the time required for action.<sup>19</sup> Likewise, a close look at negotiations surrounding the Global Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) provides an example of the indecision in exerting power in the economic arena.<sup>20</sup> Amid all this, recent examples of using military force in last resort scenarios focus on the use of decisive force to quickly achieve objectives or to provide the conditions necessary for political resolution. In either case, the tension between the longer-term, indecisive nature of pre-war power exertions and the concept of decisive force once those pre-war exertions have failed, bodes poorly for coherence in all their applications.

Certainly, in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM decisive force was used. It was used then only as a last resort, or at least as the only means to expeditiously resolve the conflict. If results in those two conflicts are any indication, the built-in tension between exerting military power and all other forms is insurmountable in circumstances which dictate last resort as a criterion. This, of course, is true if we expect the decisive force to achieve the same objectives which pre-war forces have

failed to achieve. As a result, decisive military force employed as a last resort can only be expected to achieve a degree of stability, or control, to give other power means a chance. This requires a change in how we state objectives. The change requires some deeper thought on last resort, decisive force and the principle of military operations achieving political aims. It also demands much more work by all leaders, both military and political, in integrating all elements of power prior to, during, and after military conflict.

#### THE NATURE OF DISPUTES

A discussion concerning last resort logically leads to the second important factor involved in how to think about conflict termination. This factor, which greatly complicates the integration of military power with all other forms, is the tension caused by the two types of conflict, interest-based and value-based. Ultimately, this tension is a critical factor in our inability to achieve stated strategic, political end-states. The ability to understand these two reasons for conflict or, the ability to at least clearly articulate which type of conflict exists, is critical in establishing achievable political aims. Ultimately, the fundamental approaches to these two types of conflict confuse practitioners of each type of power. This undermines the decision-making process, especially when military conflict is considered. Analyzing the fundamental tension



between these two types of conflict will help clarify the linkage between political ends, conflict termination and military operations.

Conflicts tend to arise from either value-based or interest-based disputes. Value-based disputes are "disputes over a society or way of life, claims for equality of treatment, ideology or comparable struggle".<sup>21</sup> They tend to be very difficult to terminate and require great power exertions to achieve resolution. These types of disputes often "require the presence of an external form to sustain termination"<sup>22</sup> and can ultimately only be sustained for long periods if the underlying causes are resolved voluntarily.<sup>23</sup> Value-based disputes require the "long-term transformation of political, social and economic systems"<sup>24</sup> in order to be resolved. Resolving internal ethnic strife within a nation, such as the current conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is a good example of this type of dispute.

Interest-based conflicts, on the other hand, are associated with "disputes concerning territory, roles, economics or similar issues amenable to negotiations, suasion and coercion. By implication, they are relatively superficial and tend to be transient."<sup>25</sup> Interest-based conflicts can be concluded by exerting adequate leverage at a point in time. Terminating an interest-based dispute equates to ending the immediate conflicting interests, and nothing more. When termination occurs, the costs of continuing the conflict to resolve the conflicting interests at a given point in time have become too

high for one of the adversaries. One side or the other exerts coercive leverage to resolve interest-based conflicts at a given point in time.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, the conflict terminates.

The differences highlighted above about the nature of conflicts, if understood and properly articulated, help clarify the termination issue. This may have a lasting impact upon the whole issue of using all forms of power to accomplish political aims. A discussion of this issue provides a clear means to approach disputes in today's world.

First, in today's world, conflicts seem to be complex combinations of interest and value-based disputes. We terminated the military conflicts of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM upon resolving only the interest-based disputes. In each case what remained was a political aim focused upon a value-based dispute. Restoring Panamanian democracy requires the "long-term transformation" of the values of Panamanians toward the democratic process. This was not accomplished, even though the military conflict terminated under conditions better suited for this aim than when it began. Meanwhile, what were arguably the interest-based disputes, the protection of American lives, implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty and the bringing of Noriega to justice, were resolved by employing decisive force.<sup>27</sup>

Likewise, during DESERT STORM the same thing occurred. Three objectives, the interest-based ones, were achieved upon conflict termination. The use of decisive force compelled the Iraqi Army to leave Kuwait, restored the legitimate government of Kuwait and

ensured the safety of U.S. citizens and property in Saudia Arabia and Kuwait.<sup>28</sup> Remaining is the value-based portion of the aim, the promotion of long-term peace and stability in the region. This aim, which requires the resolution of disputes over Islamic fundamentalism, tolerance of Western values, the acceptance of Israel as a nation, and so forth, again requires the "long-term transformation" of the way of life in the region.<sup>29</sup> Despite whatever one believes about the success or failure of the Gulf War, it certainly did not terminate with a long-term transformation of the way of life which will ensure peace and stability in the region.

The examples above, in their simplest terms, illustrate the fundamental approach necessary to solve disputes by exerting military power and the other elements of power. These fundamentals provide order to the process of conflict termination in today's world. Understanding and articulating the nature of the conflict allows for an orderly process in approaching conflict and its termination.

The first reason the fundamental causes for the conflict are important was demonstrated in the JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM examples described above. These conflicts, the most likely types of conflict we can expect in the future, were caused by a combination of value-based and interest-based disputes. Fundamentally, since a difference exists in how you resolve each type of dispute, a difference exists in the approach rational leaders must take toward each dispute. Understanding the complex

nature of each dispute is key to military leaders as they confront different situations.

The operational commander, and even higher level commanders, can clarify the expectations of conflict termination before becoming involved. This process, although appearing simple and basic, provides a forum for airing many neglected considerations. In DESERT STORM the political aim "to provide more stability and peace in the region than now exists" may have been successful. But, a more stringent focus upon how stable and how peaceful the region must be may have better defined the expectations of the American people. This drives everyone involved toward achieving the conditions which must exist in the region when the conflict is terminated. This focus exposes the principle that the mere application of decisive force will not resolve a value-based dispute. It also does not create false expectations.

Just as important, the clear approach toward interest-based and value-based disputes will help focus the entire Defense Department, as well as other pertinent Government agencies, on integrating and coordinating all means. Someone, possibly not the operational commander, will have to articulate just how peaceful and stable things must be before post-conflict activities can flourish. This should be done before decisive force is committed. And, to do this, a detailed, integrated plan for post-conflict, long-term activities will have to be prepared. Then, as the military campaign is planned and executed, the military practitioners focus upon decisively achieving those aims

that are interest-based while setting the conditions for fruitful accomplishment of the value-based aims.

All the foregoing ideas exist in military doctrine and thought, but seem to be cleverly hidden and complicated by a lack of focus. No appreciable effort has been applied toward clarifying disputes as a means of clarifying possible end-states. Understanding and articulating the various underlying reasons for disputes, achieved by focusing upon value-based and interest-based reasoning, will clarify the linkage between military and other forms of power.

The second reason why the fundamental causes for different disputes are important is based upon our ability to deal with a changing world. As we think about the military's place in achieving political aims, these fundamentals are important for the future. Most military leaders agree that the global power system is in the throes of tremendous change. All the pre-conceived notions about containment, deterrence and military confrontation are under revision.<sup>30</sup> It is clear that approaching disputes in the changing world is now much more complex than ever.

It is universally agreed that we can no longer approach disputes in the world with an eye toward containing Communism, namely the U.S.S.R., by focusing on Communist threats to Democratic ideals. Yet, no consensus on a new approach toward crises in the new world exists. As a result, profound changes to the military's role in America's "power portfolio" are being

considered.<sup>31</sup> Amidst this profound change, the order provided by thinking in terms of interest-based and value-based disputes is critical as we seek order in a chaotic world situation. How may this thought process be helpful?

### ROLES OF MILITARY POWER

The focus upon the two types of disputes can help clarify the roles of military power. We must think of military commitment in two ways. Consequently, we may need two militaries in today's world. One military has to be focused, trained and organized to participate in war. The other has to be focused upon operations other than war.

The first military mentioned above maintains primacy in the classic warfighting principles. It is committed as a last resort. It is committed with decisive force to quickly resolve interest, or more importantly, vital interest-based disputes. It is capable of bringing Manuel Noriega to justice, ejecting the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and securing the free flow of oil in the Persian Gulf. This military, based upon the classic military thought process, can coerce the enemy into abiding by terms of termination which protect the vital interests of America and its Allies. It can decisively terminate conflicting interests.

The second military must be focused differently. Its primary role is to achieve resolution of value-based conflicts. It is not committed as a last resort. It is not concerned with

decisively terminating disputes, but with more long-term activities coordinated closely with the other elements of power. This military is capable of operations other than war, conducted in close cooperation with, and often subservient to, leadership from the State Department or other Government agencies. It is capable of participation in the "long-term transformation" of systems within a nation which resolve value-based disputes.

The aforementioned two militaries are only proposed to clarify the thought process required in today's world, not to define separate military forces. As military options are considered, the process must focus upon one or the other. It must also be articulated in that way; this will clarify the military's role in each specific situation involved.

We must remember, although focusing the thought process toward one type of dispute or the other is a simple idea, actual execution is not simple. Obviously, much overlap occurs between all disputes in the interest or value-based areas. The line is not clear between where one stops and the other begins. Even though the warfighting military process may be a primary focus, the "other than war" military process will play a part. As a result, the tensions involved in the elements of power will always be present. This focus on how to think about disputes only clarifies these tensions. Still, that clarification helps bring order to the process; it allows the military to clarify its role in achieving political aims.

A second way the thought process of value-based and interest-based reasoning may be helpful is in the internal workings of the government outside the military. As stated above, the military can articulate its role in disputes using the fundamentals as a model. The NCA and other involved government agencies must also understand and accept this line of reasoning. If they do, the ramifications are important.

An acceptance of the two militaries by the Department of Defense (DOD) will diminish the debate over last resort, decisive force and end-states in many situations. This leads to a clear line of authority which clarifies responsibilities. For example, for all "operations other than war," those focused toward resolving value-based disputes, the military will work directly for someone else. The onus is then upon another agency to develop a campaign plan which integrates the military force. On the other hand, for "war", those focused toward terminating interest-based disputes, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the region or another military commander, will be in charge. Clearly then, upon termination of the interest-based dispute, the responsibility shifts back. This clarifies responsibilities in the dispute.

Finally, the whole realm of pre-hostilities and post-conflict activities takes on a clearer role as we focus upon the type of dispute involved. In fact, much work has already been done, and continues to be done, in an attempt to coordinate, integrate and clarify these activities. Such new ideas as Flexible Deterrent



Options (FDO's), which provide integrated options of influence prior to military conflict, represent an attempt by the military to clarify the process.<sup>32</sup> These FDO's can be focused on value-based conflicts.

The whole range of ideas about post-conflict activities, spectrum of conflict, termination criterion, and so forth, beg for clarity of thought about who is in charge, how power is integrated and why. Even Caspar Weinberger's six tests for committing military force alluded to earlier, resulted from concern over this issue.<sup>33</sup> Again, simply by classifying the aims as the result of terminating an interest-based or value-based dispute, the tension between the elements of power is diminished.

#### CONCLUSION

As we think about conflict termination in the future, the ideas espoused in this paper have a lasting impact upon providing order to the process. First, we have explored the ramifications of exerting military power as a last resort. As illustrated, this concept creates immense challenges to military leaders. Military power, exerted decisively after all other means have failed, cannot be smoothly integrated with the other power elements. The mere fact that all other power means have failed causes too many complications for re-integration once the military operation is terminated.

In JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM all other forms of power use were suspended, or diminished, while the "war" was fought. Upon termination of the "war", defined by establishing control in the region, a return to the primacy of other forms of power was necessary. This return to pre-hostility responsibility was, and remains, extremely complex. When military power is exerted as a last resort, the coherent integration and coordination of its use with the others, will remain difficult. The vast differences between military power exertions and the other elements of power will always work against coherence and cause tension in the process. No simple solution to this problem exists; the best we can hope for is continued emphasis in integrated planning and execution.

Most importantly, exerting decisive military power as a last resort cannot be expected to quickly accomplish all political aims in a conflict. As demonstrated in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, the expectations of results remain too high. Remember, the failure of the other forms of power in support of U.S. foreign policy cause the use of overwhelming military power. It is futile to expect a reversal of this failure by the mere application of overwhelming military force.

Ultimately, approaching conflicts as combinations of value-based and interest-based disputes is the most important conclusion we should draw. The impact of this idea upon how we think about disputes, their resolution or termination, and the

integration of all forms of power to pursue political aims may provide order to today's chaotic process.

This thought process, although not a panacea for success, provides an orderly approach to linking military power and the other elements. Employing overwhelming military force in decisive conflict toward objectives which resolve interest-based disputes focuses all efforts upon achievable aims. By necessity, largely because we will directly risk American lives in these conflicts, the military chain of command will be in charge in these operations. This military chain of command has no choice but to direct its efforts toward accomplishing military objectives. These, by definition, set the conditions for termination of the conflicting interests in the region and, by implication, this means providing the stability and control necessary for the other power elements to once again become effective.

We also know by our foregoing discussion that the conflicting interests are almost always accompanied by other, value-based disputes. All must realize that executing the military campaign will not resolve these. The military cannot ignore these disputes, but must temper its activities to facilitate the ultimate transition to the use of other power means; this is the best the military can do. A campaign plan designed to achieve the necessary conditions mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the use of military operations other than war will facilitate this transition. Still, the focus must be on terminating the

military conflict first; after all, "a good campaign will win - the best campaign will win at minimum cost".<sup>34</sup>

These overriding considerations, brought to light by a thought process focused upon the nature of the dispute, bring order to the chaos of conflicts in today's world. Two militaries, promulgated in the minds of all military commanders and articulated to the NCA based upon the situation at hand, can go far toward minimizing the tensions between military power and all other forms. In this way we can more easily identify which elements of power can achieve which type of political aims. This also will assist in determining which agency should take the lead, and which ones should play supporting roles. All these factors provide a more coherent approach to integrating power throughout. Ultimately, our future hinges on how we think about conflict termination in the future.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>New York Times, (New York City, N.Y.), 28 December 1992; 14, 17, 21 January 1993.

<sup>2</sup>Fred C. Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 6-16.

<sup>3</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 579.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 87.

<sup>5</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Preliminary Draft), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 21 August 1992), 6-3.

<sup>6</sup>Seminar Five, U.S. Army War College Class of 1993, discussion with all members and faculty for Course 2, War, National Policy, and Strategy September 1992, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

<sup>7</sup>Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress, Fiscal Year 1987, by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 78-82.

<sup>8</sup>Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel (Ret), On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1982), 111-122.

<sup>9</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 15 April 1992), 29.

<sup>10</sup>Frederick Kempe, "The Panama Debacle," in Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama: Implications for U.S. Policy, ed. Eva Laser (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), 1-20.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 17.

<sup>12</sup>FM 100-5, 7-3.

<sup>13</sup>Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 31 August 1992), 8.

<sup>14</sup>FM 100-5, 7-28.

<sup>15</sup>Bruce B.G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: A Rational Model (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 May 1992), 20

<sup>16</sup>Michael R. Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times 28 September 92, A1.

<sup>17</sup>Kempe, 20.

<sup>18</sup>Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," Military Review 10 (October 1992), 48-54; Bruce B.G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: A Rational Model (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, SSI, May 1992), 21-32.

<sup>19</sup>Seminar Five, U.S. Army War College Class of 1993, discussion with all members and faculty for Course 3, National Military Requirements and Capabilities October 1992, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

<sup>20</sup>Seminar Five, USAWC Class of 1993, discussion with all members and faculty, Commandant's Lecture Series, January 1993, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

<sup>21</sup>Rampy, 46.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 46.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>27</sup>Fishel, 5.

<sup>28</sup>FM 100-5, 20.

<sup>29</sup>Mansour Farhang, "The United States and the Question of Democracy in the Middle East," Current History 92 (January 93): 1-5.

<sup>30</sup>Walter Wojdakowski, "The New Global System of Power: Contours for the Present and Future" (Course 2 Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992), 1-11.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 8-10.

<sup>32</sup>Walter Wojdakowski, "Flexible Deterrent Options: The CINC's Double-Edged Sword" (Course 4 Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992), 1-4.

<sup>33</sup>Weinberger, 48-52.

<sup>34</sup>FM 100-5, 7-3.

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